

## REPORT

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SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO. 1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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8. Construction work at the field could not be continued between 1 and 2\* February because of frost. [redacted] work was to start at full scale on 1 March 1954. 25X1
9. Construction superintendent Mamani (fnu) inspected the construction site at the field on 11 February. He was allegedly to become chief supervisor on 1 March, as the previous chief supervisor Koetz (fnu) was to be transferred to Zeitz. 25X1
10. During the first days of February, six soldiers wearing red-bordered black epaulets and crossed-axe insignia did surveying work at the field. They arrived daily on truck [redacted] surveying work extended from the southwestern corner of the taxiway toward Kurtschlag where the Soviets had planned to clear a 100-meter-wide strip of woods. 25X1
11. During the frost period, 40 to 50 percent of the cement stored in the cement storage sheds froze. During the first half of February, about 20 carloads of fine chippings arrived at the construction site. [redacted] several material shipments were expected and would arrive daily after 1 March. 25X1
12. Between 8 and 13 February, the German construction staff was ordered by the Soviets: to stop work at the previous dispersal areas and to make out the accounts for work previously done there; to resume clearing work in the road and spur track area of the second construction stage near the bomb and ammunition dump; to complete surveying work by 23 February 1954, on a 160-meter-wide strip to as far as an area about 2.5 km southwest of the taxiway and, subsequently, to start clearing work there. The German construction staff believed that repair shops or repair hangars were to be constructed there. At the end of February, before surveying work was completed, a 80-meter-wide lane had to be cut in the 160-meter-wide strip. Furthermore, the German construction staff was ordered to survey an area, 640 x 200 meters, just south of the east end of the taxiway by 28 February. [redacted] location sketch of the latter two sites. 1 25X1
14. A geological expert's report was to be made of the soil 2 km around the middle of the field but not, as previously reported, on an area 4 km around. For this purpose, the first inspection of the field took place on 12 February involving Major Churbanov (fnu) of the Soviet construction headquarters in Werder; chief construction supervisor Stolz (fnu) of the Bauunion Brandenburg; surveying engineer Brandes (fnu) of the Schorfheide construction staff; Dr. Medon (fnu) (phonetic spelling), probably of the state geological commission; and a Soviet engineer from Moscow who wore civilian clothes. This Soviet engineer was an elderly man and was usually held in the background by the other Soviets. [redacted] he was Lieutenant Colonel Antonov (fnu). Major Churbanov lead the commission through the wooded area of the field and marked several points where geological tests were to be made. When asked, Churbanov said that houses were to be built there. Lieutenant Colonel Antonov gave orders for test drillings, up to a depth of 10 meters, about 1 km east and west of the runway ends and on the area between the runway and taxiway. [redacted] the Soviet construction staff, as the contractor at Schorfheide airfield, had apparently failed to have a geological expert's report made prior to the beginning of construction work. [redacted] this omission was reproved by the superior headquarters and, therefore, the report had to be made after construction work had already started. 2 25X1

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15. The final balance of construction costs incurred so far showed a deficiency of 551,000 eastmarks. It must be taken into account however, that a 5 percent profit of the construction amount, i.e. about 800,000 eastmarks had already been paid to the state. The costs for work to be done in 1954 were ordered to be lowered by 4.3 percent, although the expenses for material, freight and wages remained the same as in the preceding year. Therefore, an order was given that the savings be made by a new working method and by performing 90 percent of the construction work on the basis of piece work.
16. During the second half of February, the German construction staff received the construction plan for the bomb and ammunition dump approved by the Soviets. [redacted] only the fence, the roads and the concrete foundations were to be constructed by the Bauunion Brandenburg, while the ammunition sheds were scheduled to be built later on by Soviet soldiers. According to the construction plan, only two of the three ammunition houses which had been constructed during the first construction stage were to be provided with rails leading to the spur track. [redacted] at the ammunition houses which were equipped with rails, the ammunition boxes would be lifted on the railroad cars by means of a mobile crane, while, near the third ammunition house or the one without rails, the ammunition boxes would be transloaded from the railroad cars onto special carriages and thus hauled into the shed, and stored on beams there. [redacted] the bombs were almost as long as the width of a gate, i.e. 4 meters [redacted] sketch of the process of the transportation of ammunition. 3
17. Civil engineer Trofimkin (phonetic spelling) (fnu) was detached to the construction headquarters as deputy of Lieutenant Colonel Oleinik (fnu), chief of the designs section. Major Petrov (phonetic spelling) (fnu) became the new chief of the material supply section. 2
18. [redacted] 25X1
19. In mid-February, surveying work for an undetermined type of construction work was done in forest sub-districts (Jagen) Nos 212/239 to 221/247. The new construction superintendent at the field was Herr Mamani (fnu). 25X1
20. [redacted] 25X1
1. Comment. Construction work at Schorfheide airfield was considerably limited because of the frost. Furthermore, the decisions on additional construction work could be reached only after the arrival of the expected engineer officer from Moscow. Noteworthy in this connection are the Soviet orders, mentioned in paragraph 13, particularly the information on the discontinuation of work on the dispersal areas. For course of 160-meter-wide strip from the taxiway toward the southwest, see Annex 1, [redacted] For location of the surveyed area south of the east end of the runway, see Annex [redacted] 25X1

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
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Annex 2

25X1

Surveyed Area South of East End of the Runway

Not to scale.



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The information on surveying work, mentioned in paragraphs 10 and 19, probably refers to work which had previously been started. It appears possible that quartering buildings and camps for the AA gun emplacements on the northern edge of the woods are to be constructed in the Jagen mentioned.

25X1

2. Comment. Dr. Medon, Lieutenant Colonel Antonov, and engineer Trofinkin are reported for the first time. Test drillings and diggings, particularly efforts to determine the subsoil water level were ordered previously.

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3. Comment. This is the first information on the type and size of ammunition which is to be transported into the ammunition houses. For diagrammatic sketch of the process of transporting ammunition from the spur track into the ammunition houses, see Annex 5.

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4. [REDACTED]

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5. Comment: The unusually large size of the bombs described in Paragraph 16, above, might raise the question whether the sketch was actually drawn to scale.

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
Annex 1

25X1

Strip Southwest of the Landing Field  
on which Surveying Work is Done

Scale 1:25000

See Map 33°S 4414, sheet  
2946/47



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
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Annex

25X1

Surveyed Area South of East end of the Runway

Not to scale.



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
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
Annex 5

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
Diagram Indicating the Handling of Ammunition  
at Schorfheide Airfield



a) shed with rail connection



b) shed without  
rail connection



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